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United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., ___ F. 3d ___, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10477, 2017 WL 2541042 (9th Cir. 2017)
Ryan L. Hickey
Attempts to alter water use agreements, especially those spanning
back decades or even centuries, elicit intense scrutiny from water rights
holders. In United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist.1, the Ninth Circuit
upheld application of a 1935 Decree apportioning water among various
regional entities, including two Indian tribes, to bar a mineral company
from transferring water rights between properties within the Gila River
drainage.
I. INTRODUCTION
From its New Mexico headwaters, the Gila River flows roughly
500 miles west across Arizona before intersecting with the Colorado River
near Yuma.2 Most of its water, however, does not make it that far, with the
stream often running dry halfway through its drainage.3 The Gila’s water
woes are not an anomaly in the southwest, where high temperatures,
limited precipitation, and burgeoning demand stress virtually all regional
water sources. Moreover, competition among users, whether individuals,
industries, or entire municipalities and even states, can be fierce.
The Gila highlights this; water controversies have recently arisen
between New Mexico and Arizona4, Phoenix and the Gila River Indian
Tribe5, and a mineral company and two regional Indian communities. This
case concerns that last conflict, involving the Gila River Indian
Community (“Community”), the San Carlos Apache Tribe (“Tribe”), and
various other water rights holders in the drainage.6 Most notable of that
last group is Freeport Minerals Corporation (“Freeport”), which began
purchasing area farms in 1997 primarily for their water rights.7
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This case grew out of litigation beginning nearly a century ago
when, in 1925, the United States first brought suit on behalf of the Tribe
and Community seeking better Gila River management.8 Those efforts
culminated in the 1935 Globe Equity Decree (“Decree”), regulating water
among the Community, Tribe, and other stakeholders.9 The decree granted
the Community and Tribe senior-most water rights, established that users
could divert water for “beneficial use” and “irrigation,” and granted that
users may “change the point of diversion and the places, means, manner
or purpose of the use of the waters to which they are so entitled or any part
thereof, so far as they may do so without injury to the rights of other
parties.”10 These proceedings hinge on that final point.
II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1993, the district court implemented a “Change in Use Rule”
specifying how water rights could be severed from one piece of property
and transferred to another. Doing so required filing a “sever and transfer
application,” public notice and comment opportunity, and possibly a
district court hearing.11 At any hearing, the applicant would bear “the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of no injury to the rights of other
parties under the Gila Decree.”12
In 1996, the district court entered a Water Quality Injunction
directing the Water Commissioner to limit diversions of upstream water
rights holders should water quality reaching the Tribe fall below certain
benchmarks.13 Then, in 2001, groups including the Tribe and Community
filed a complaint against several thousand landowners (collectively, the
“Upper Valley Defendants” or “UVDs”) allegedly exceeding decreed
rights via well pumping.14 That led to the Upper Valley Forbearance
Agreement (“UVFA”), wherein plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the
complaint in return for the UVD agreeing to reduce irrigation entitlements
by 1,000 acres.15 The UVFA also included a provision allowing UVDs to
sever and transfer water rights from decreed lands to “Hot Lands” not
previously covered by the decree.16
In 2008, the United States, Tribe, and Community filed objections
to 419 sever-and-transfer applications filed under the UVFA, fifty-nine of
which came from Freeport.17 The district court created a sub-docket
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exclusively for Freeport’s applications, from which it chose ten to begin
review. Initially, the district court ruled Freeport described parcels with
inadequate specificity, holding that they must state the “precise locations
of the parcels.”18 Freeport subsequently created more detailed maps and
descriptions of relevant lands, which it disclosed during discovery in
November 2009.19
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the Tribe’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law in August 2010, denying all
Freeport’s initially reviewed applications.20 It concluded (1) Freeport did
not present a prima facie case showing no injury to Decree parties, (2)
Arizona’s statutory forfeiture law did not apply, (3) Freeport partially
abandoned water rights in one of its parcels, and (4) Freeport would not
be allowed to update applications with revised maps.21
Freeport’s first appeal of the district court order failed, as the
Ninth Circuit deemed it “neither a partial nor a final judgment” and thus
declined jurisdiction.22 On September 4, 2014, the district court entered
“final judgment with respect to, and in accordance with, all the Court’s
orders and proceedings on the 419 applications to sever and transfer
Decree water rights filed with the Water Commissioner in 2008."
Thereafter, the United States, the Community, the Tribe, Freeport, and
several other landowners timely filed appeals and cross-appeals.
III. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit Panel began by addressing jurisdictional
questions.23 After determining the court could only properly claim
jurisdiction over select applications on appeal, the Panel took up the merits
of Appellant’s arguments.24
The Panel first considered which applications, if any, were
appealable.25 At the district court, all 2008 sever-and-transfer applications
filed by non-Freeport parties were either dismissed without prejudice or
voluntarily withdrawn.26 “The general rule in [the Ninth C]ircuit” states
“voluntary dismissals without prejudice do not create appealable, final
judgments.”27 Likewise, a withdrawn application does not create an
appealable, final judgment.28 Because “Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement precludes federal courts from deciding questions that cannot
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affect the rights of litigants in the case before them,”29 the Panel
determined it lacked jurisdiction over non-Freeport applications.30 The
Court further justified that holding via Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b), which requires that a court expressly direct entry of judgment to
achieve finality in a ruling.31
Having confined jurisdiction to Freeport, the Court then evaluated
that firm’s fifty-nine applications.32 Ultimately, it accepted three covered
by the August 2010 order but not involving restrictive covenants, one in
which the district court ruled Freeport abandoned its water right,33 and
fourteen of the twenty denied by the district court in its August 2010
order.34 Thus, from several hundred options, the Court took up only
eighteen Freeport applications.
With jurisdiction addressed, the Court moved on to merits.
Freeport alleged four issues on appeal. First, the district court erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law to Plaintiffs.35 Second, the district
court erroneously denied Freeport’s motion to amend applications with
revised maps.36 Third, Arizona’s law of statutory forfeiture was
improperly applied.37 And fourth, the district court erred in finding
Freeport abandoned water rights on 1.4 acres of one application.38
Regarding judgment as a matter of law, Freeport disputed the
district court’s holding that it had not presented a prima facie case of no
injury to other Decree parties.39 To fulfill this burden, Freeport included a
generic statement in all applications:
All that will be changed as a result of this application will be
the location of decreed rights and associated point of diversion
under the Globe Equity No. 59 Decree. The priorities, volumes
of water use and acreage will not change. There will be no net
increase or decrease in decreed rights as a result of this
proposed severance and transfer.40

Freeport provided no further evidence regarding absence of injury, and the
district court deemed the vague, generalized statement insufficient to meet
the required burden of proof.41
This Court not only agreed with the district court, but also
highlighted possible injuries arising from proposed transfers.42 First, the
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Court discussed a unique Gila River feature—“Cosper’s Crossing”—
where the river frequently runs dry above ground.43 When that occurs,
upstream users can legally divert the entire river before it reaches that
point.44 Because at least one of Freeport’s applications proposed
transferring an allotment from downstream of Cosper’s Crossing to
upstream, the Court noted that change could have broad effects.45
Specifically, moving an allotment from below to above Cosper’s Crossing
could cause the crossing to run dry earlier, triggering the provision
allowing upstream users to divert the entire river earlier as well.46
The Court then discussed how changed locations could impact
return flows, and examined transferring a water allotment from a parcel
used near the river to one used further away.47 Though they take identical
amounts, those may return different amounts to the river due to
evaporation, soil consumption, or even movement outside the Gila
subflow zone.48 Lastly, the Court highlighted an application that would
turn a ground-level diversion into a well. Such a change could impact river
salinity, potentially harming downstream users like the Tribe.49 For those
reasons, plus Freeport’s failure to address potential cumulative effects of
its many applications, the Court held that Freeport did not show its
applications would not harm others and thus the district court did not err
in rejecting the applications on those grounds.50
Freeport next contested the district court’s denial of its motion to
amend applications with revised maps. 51 The Court, however, found it was
unclear whether Freeport ever sought leave to amend those applications.52
While generally construed liberally to allow amendments, the Court noted
Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not mandatory.53
Additionally, because the amended maps constituted “material changes,”
the Court held allowing Freeport to amend would have prejudiced some
parties (and may have prejudiced others).54
Arizona’s law of statutory forfeiture provided the court’s next
topic, one on which Freeport finally prevailed. The district court
conducted its own analysis of Arizona’s forfeiture code, which this Court
deemed erroneous because the Arizona Supreme Court had established
controlling precedent.55 The Panel thus held “[t]here was no need to
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evaluate further the 1919 water code. The Arizona Supreme Court is the
final arbiter of Arizona law, and it had already found that statutory
forfeiture applies to pre-1919 water rights.”56 Consequently, this Court
instructed the district court to reconsider statutory forfeiture on remand.57
Finally, the Panel addressed Freeport’s appeal denying it
abandoned 1.4 acres of water rights in one application.58 This Court held
that while Freeport made some showings contradicting abandonment (its
overarching purpose in acquiring lands for water rights, its maintenance
of water-related facilities, its paying of related taxes and fees), those did
not overcome the countervailing evidence.59 In particular, because
Freeport also made improvements suggesting it no longer wanted or
needed the right in question, and because the district court narrowly
tailored its finding to 1.4 acres of the 15.5-acre parcel, that ruling was not
in error.60
IV. CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS
Overall, this case highlights the complexities of water law and
related litigation. Between the diverse stakeholders, near-century of prior
agreements and proceedings, threshold jurisdictional questions, and
multiple issues on appeal, parsing relevant facts and law from this decision
to explain its outcomes—including all of affirm, dismiss, reverse, and
remand—is challenging.
The Court’s most notable decision here was affirming denial of
Freeport’s sever-and-transfer applications due to noncompliance with the
eighty-year-old Decree. That marked a victory for the Community and
Tribe, senior-most water rights holders whose downstream location puts
the quantity and quality of their available water at particular risk. As this
case reinforced, while those groups have legal mechanisms to address
upstream conflicts when they occur, the Decree still requires other users
to prevent such problems in the first place when possible.61
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